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//2A-3/28/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CHAUTAUQUA COUNTY EMPLOYEES UNIT 6300, 
CHAUTAUQUA COUNTY LOCAL 807, CSEA, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
— — — - . — ——Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-9087 
COUNTY OF CHAUTAUQUA, 
Respondent. 
LIPSITZ, GREEN, FAHRINGER, ROLL, SCHULLER & JAMES 
(RONALD L. JAROS, ESQ., of Counsel), for Charging 
Party 
ROBERT M. LAUGHLIN, COUNTY ATTORNEY (MICHAEL J. 
SULLIVAN, ESQ., of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on a single exception of the 
County of Chautauqua (County) to an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ) decision which upheld an improper practice charge filed 
by the Chautauqua County Employees Unit 63 00, Chautauqua 
County Local 807, CSEA, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(CSEA). The charge alleges that the County violated §209-
a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by 
failing to negotiate in good faith-i/ and by unilaterally 
subcontracting bargaining unit work prior to the conclusion 
i/The County does not except to the ALJ's finding that it 
failed to negotiate in good faith. Therefore, we do not 
address it herein. 
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of the negotiating process. In particular, the charge 
alleges, and the ALT found, that after making the decision to 
contract out certain laundry services on or about May 2, 
1986, the County, on or about August 8, 1986, subcontracted a 
—port-ion—of the laundry- services exclusively—per-£ormed-by 
bargaining unit employees at the Chautauqua County Home 
(Home), a nursing facility operated by the County. Both the 
decision to subcontract and the execution of a contract 
occurred during the negotiating process and prior to a 
legislative determination, which was issued on or about 
November 12, 1986. 
The County's exception is as follows: 
The County faced a compelling reason to 
act unilaterally at the time it acted, 
despite various extensions in time prior 
to the implementation. The 
administrative law judge was mislead by 
confusion over the time requirements due 
to a three-year construction schedule. 
The need to replace boilers as part of a 
three-year capital project created a 
compelling circumstance which required 
immediate action - thus the subcontract. 
In reaching her determination, the ALT considered the 
County's defense that its unilateral action concerning a 
mandatory subject of bargaining was justified by compelling 
circumstances. In doing so, the ALT relied upon evidence 
which establishes that the County sought to realize savings 
in its operational costs by replacing its boiler system, 
which, in turn, would lower repair costs and increase fuel 
r~ 
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efficiency. The evidence further establishes that its 
decision to replace its heating system required the County to 
make a determination concerning whether, and to what extent, 
it would continue to perform laundry services in-house, since 
continuation- of-these—services—would—necessitate—some— —-. 
modification and additional cost in the installation of the 
new heating system. No evidence was presented to establish 
that the existing system was not functional or that the need 
for the new heating system was imminent. The testimony 
showed only that the system was old, required frequent 
repair, and was not as cost effective as more modern systems. 
The ALT found that the monetary savings sought by the 
j County to be realized by early implementation of its decision 
to subcontract laundry services did not constitute a 
compelling reason for unilateral action prior to the 
conclusion of the negotiating process otherwise required by 
the Act.-2-/ In so finding, the ALT considered that although 
the County made the decision, on May 2, 1986, to contract out 
laundry services, and entered into such a contract on August 
8, 1986, allegedly in order to enable it to install a new 
heating system during 1987, the heating system was not in 
fact installed until 1988, contradicting the County's 
assertion that its May 1986 decision was essential to the 
construction schedule it had previously established and 
^/see County of Genesee, 18 PERB H3016 (1985). 
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j needed to follow, and with which it could not allow 
negotiations to interfere. 
Although the County's exception asserts that "[T]he need 
to replace boilers. . . created a compelling circumstance 
-which- required-immediate-act ion—.—.—.-'-•-,- it- points —to—no 
record evidence which might prove a need to replace boilers 
at the time originally scheduled, in support of this 
j assertion. 
Having failed to establish an operational need to take 
unilateral action, the County's compelling need defense rests 
entirely upon economic savings, which the ALT found, and we 
agree, does not by itself rise to the level of compelling 
j need as we have defined it.-3/ 
We find that the ALT properly rejected the County's 
compelling need^/ defense to the unilateral action charge and 
that the decision finding a violation of §209-a.l(d) of the 
^/The ALT properly concluded, based upon prior decisions of 
this Board, that economic reasons do not constitute 
compelling need sufficient to avoid obligations under the Act 
(Rush-Henrietta CSD, 21 PERB [^3023 (1988) (appeal pending) ; 
Webster CSD, 20 PERB 1(3064 (1987), conf'd, A.D.2d (4th 
Dep't Feb. 9, 1989); Saratoga Springs School District. 11 
PERB f3037 (1978), conf'd. 68 A.D.2d 202, 12 PERB ^7008 (3d 
Dep't 1979), motion for leave to appeal deniedr 47 N.Y.2d 
711, 12 PERB f7012 (1979)). 
^•/compelling need has been construed by this Board as 
constituting a demonstrated emergency, as to which all other 
options have been exhausted. See Wappingers CSD, 19 PERB 
53037 (1986) ; New York City Transit Authority, 19 PERB ?[3043 
(1986); Addison CSD, 16 PERB [^3099 (1983). 
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Act should be and hereby is affirmed. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the County: 
1. Cease and desist from unilaterally subcontracting 
the exclusive work of employees within the 
bargaining—unit -represented—by— CSEA—to—nonunit— -----
personnel; 
2. Restore all laundry service unit work to unit 
employees; in the event it is impossible to restore 
unit work, make comparable work available to all 
displaced employees without loss of work to any 
current unit employee, or pay unit employees all 
lost wages and benefits until such unit work 
becomes available; 
3. Pay unit members any lost wages or benefits 
suffered as a result of subcontracting unit laundry 
service work, plus interest at the legal rate, less 
interim earnings; 
4. Negotiate in good faith with CSEA concerning the 
terms and conditions of employment of unit 
employees; and 
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5. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
customarily used to communicate with unit 
employees. 
-DA-T-E-D: Ma-reh—2-8-r-l-98-9- .-- .-———-• 
Albany, New York 
Harold R 
CA^UJG^ 
. Newman, < 
{?^>is—itc^-*^-
Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL E 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
RUBLIC EMPLP^MENTJEUTLQ 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the County of Chautauqua in the unit 
represented by the Chautauqua County Employees Unit 6300, Chautauqua 
County Local 807, CSEA, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, that the County 
of Chautauqua: 
lc Will not unilaterally subcontract the exclusive work of employees 
within the bargaining unit represented by CSEA to nonunit personnel; 
2. Will restore all laundry service unit work to unit employees; 
in the event it is impossible to restore unit work, make comparable 
work available to all displaced employees without loss of work to any 
current unit employee, or pay unit employees all lost wages and benefits 
unitl such unit work becomes available; 
3. Will pay unit members any lost wages or benefits suffered 
as a result of .subcontracting unit laundry service work, plus interest 
at the legal rate, less interim earnings; and 
4o Will negotiate in good faith with CSEA concerning the terms 
and conditions of employment of unit employees., 
COUNTY OF CHAUTAUQUA 
Dated By (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
#2B-3/28/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
YATES COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
—.-. -- -—-.- and- - r —GA-SE-.-NQ-.—U—9-6-7-6—.- •—-:-. 
COUNTY OF YATES, 
Respondent. 
GAGE, GAGE, VAN HORN & ROESCH, ESQS. (WALTER C. 
GAGE, ESQ., of Counsel), for Charging Party 
ROBERT C. FOSTER, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the County of 
Yates (County) to an Administrative Law Judge (AKJ) decision 
which held that the County violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by unilaterally changing the 
amount of the required co-payment from $2.00 to $5.00 under a 
prescription drug rider to the medical insurance plan applicable 
to employees represented by the Yates County Deputy Sheriff's 
Association (Association). 
On the basis of a stipulated record, the ALJ found that the 
County had provided unit employees with Blue Cross/Blue Shield 
(BC/BS) health insurance coverage since 1953. Since 1976, 
collective bargaining agreements entered into between the parties 
have included the following language concerning health insurance: 
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At the written request of any employee, 
the County shall pay one hundred (100) 
per cent of such employee's Blue Cross 
and Blue Shield medical insurance, for 
individual or family coverage, whichever 
is requested, provided such insurance is 
•:•—•— .—. -ea-r-r-ied—through—the—¥-ates—County—Biue— 
Cross and Blue Shield group contract. 
In August 1976, the County unilaterally instituted a 
prescription drug rider, which included a $2.00 employee co-
payment requirement, to the BC/BS coverage being provided to unit 
employees. The rider and co-payment continued in effect until 
July 1, 1987, when, pursuant to notification of an increase from 
BC/BS, the co-payment was increased from $2.00 to $5.00. 
) The County's exceptions assert that, although the 
prescription drug rider benefit is not referenced in the 
collective bargaining agreement between the parties, it is an 
integral part of the standard health insurance plan provided by 
the County and is a "standard part of the policy". However, no 
evidentiary basis is provided for this assertion, nor is there 
any record evidence to support the County's claim that, whether 
the prescription drug rider was in fact a part of the standard 
policy or not, it was treated as such by the parties. 
Furthermore, the stipulated record states that "[t]he $2.00 
prescription co-payment rider was unilaterally implemented by the 
County in August 1976 in conjunction with its unilateral 
provision to the unit of a prescription rider to the [BC/BS] 
) coverage" (emphases added). 
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Based upon the foregoing, we concur with the ALJ's findings 
that the prescription drug rider was a benefit provided as a 
matter of past practice by the County, and was not a matter 
covered by the parties' collective bargaining agreement; that the 
Increase i-n-th-e-,Go--pa-yiae-n-t----f-r-om--$-2--.-0-0- to $-5.00 is-a-mandatory--—— 
subject of bargaining; that the County has failed to meet its 
burden of proving that the prescription drug rider is encompassed 
within and is a part of the standard BC/BS insurance policy; 1/ 
and that the County unilaterally, albeit pursuant to a change in 
the offering by BC/BS,-2-/ increased the amount of the employee's 
co-payment from $2.00 to $5.00, altering the benefit it had 
established by past practice. 
The County's exceptions are, accordingly, denied and the ALJ 
1/compare Unateqo CSD, 20 PERB H3004, at 3011 (1987), conf'd sub 
nom. Unateqo Non-Teaching Ass'n. v. PERBf 134 A.D. 2d 62, 21 PERB 
}[7002 (3rd Dep't 1987), motion for leave to appeal denied, 71 
N.Y. 2d 805, 21 PERB ^7010 (1988), in which this Board found, on 
facts specific to that case, that "the past practice established 
by the District was its participation in the State Employees 
Health Insurance Plan, whatever the specific benefits, costs and 
administrative machinery that plan happened to entail. The 
charging parties have presented nothing to us which would warrant 
the conclusion that the specific benefits and administrative 
machinery available through the Statewide Plan and the GHI option 
on December 31, 1985, should be considered the past practice for 
the purposes of this case." We accordingly there found no 
unilateral change in terms and conditions of employment when the 
District changed from a GHI Plan to the Empire Plan. 
•2/The ALJ found as fact that the $2.00 co-payment had not 
been entirely eliminated from the offerings of BC/BS and 
accordingly found that impossibility of continued provision of 
the benefit was not a defense to the duty to negotiate which 
otherwise exist. These findings are not the subject of 
exceptions and are thus not now before us. 
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decision finding that the County violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act 
is affirmed. The County is hereby ordered to: 
1. Immediately make available to unit employees the BC/BS 
$2.00 co-payment prescription drug rider, or an equal 
benefit, as it existed prior to July 1, 1987; 
---:——2-.—-M-afce.-.-'u-nit— emp-1-oyees—whoie—for- any~-l-oss-"or^ dl^ inuta-OTi~ ±n^ 
benefits caused by the elimination of said drug rider 
and the substitution of the $5.00 co-payment 
prescription drug rider; 
3. Negotiate in good faith with the Association regarding 
the terms and conditions of employment of unit 
employees; and 
4. Sign and post notice in the form attached at all 
locations normally used for communication to employees 
in the unit. 
DATED: March 28, 1989 
Albany, New York 
^fi^&-&4? /C. /&ur?« 
H a r o l d R. Newman, Chairman 
* - * . 
W a l t e r L. E i s e n b e r g , Membe 
APPENDIX 
i i i NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
'
n
 ~ all employees in the unit represented by the Yates 
County Deputy Sheriff's Association that the County of Yates : 
1. Will immediately make available to unit 
employees the Blue Cross/Blue Shield $2.00 co-
payment prescription drug rider, or an equal 
benefit, as it existed prior to July 1, 1987; 
2. Will make unit employees whole for any 
loss or diminution in benefits caused by the 
elimination of said rider and the substitution 
of the $5.00 co-payment prescription drug rider; 
and 
3. Will negotiate in good faith with the 
Association regarding the terms and conditions 
of employment of unit employees. 
.COUNTY. .OF. .YATES. 
Dated By • • • • 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered,
 s 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SCHENECTADY POLICE BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-10242 
CITY OF SCHENECTADY, 
Respondent. 
GRASSO & GRASSO, ESQS. (JANE K. FININ, ESQ., of 
Counsel) , for Charging Party 
BUCHYN, O'HARE & WERNER, ESQS. (JOSEPH BUCHYN, ESQ., 
of Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The City of Schenectady (City) excepts to an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision which found that the 
City violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees1 Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it refused to negotiate certain 
demands made by the Schenectady Police Benevolent Association 
(PBA). The City, in defense of its refusal to negotiate, 
asserts that because the parties have proceeded to interest 
arbitration pursuant to §209.4 of the Act, its duty to 
bargain concerning language for a successor agreement to the 
parties1 expired agreement has ceased. The City also argues 
that, in any event, the demands made by the PBA are 
nonmandatory. 
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The ALJ held that, with the exception of one demand 
(which is not at issue before us, because it is not the 
subject of exceptions), the demands made by the PBA are 
mandatory, and further held that, notwithstanding the 
pencjency- of—an- interest^arbitration—proceedingy" the~Gity ~is—--
under a continuing duty to negotiate mandatory subjects of 
negotiation, unless waived. 
In its exceptions, the City alleges numerous errors of 
fact and law and requests dismissal of the charge. 
Facts 
The sequence of events leading up to the instant charge 
is long and complicated, having begun with the expiration of 
) the parties' agreement on December 31, 1985. On that date, 
the City presented demands to the PBA for a successor 
agreement. The City's proposal was to delete numerous 
sections of the parties' prior agreement, which it then 
listed on the last page of its 14-page proposal as "Non-
Mandatory Items". The parties apparently engaged in 
negotiations during 1986, declaring impasse and proceeding 
through mediation during the latter part of the year. In 
late December 198 6, the PBA filed a petition for interest 
arbitration with this Board. Immediately thereafter, on 
January 8, 1987, the City filed an improper practice charge, 
objecting to the arbitrability of those PBA demands 
identified in its December 31, 1985 proposal. The PBA 
j 
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subsequently withdrew its interest arbitration petition, and 
the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) dismissed the City's charge (Case 
No. U-9180) upon the ground that it was moot (2 0 PERB 54517 
The City thereafter filed its own interest arbitration 
petition on March 9, 1987. The petition included demands for 
new contract language, continuation of some existing contract 
language, and deletion of those articles set forth in the 
City's December 31, 1985 list of "Non-Mandatory Items." 
Thereafter, on or about June 22, 1987, the City filed an 
improper practice charge against the PBA, asserting its 
violation of §209-a.l(d) of the Act by its insistence upon 
pursuing at interest arbitration demands which the City 
maintained were nonmandatory. That charge, Case No. U-9509, 
resulted in an ALJ decision (20 PERB 5[4636 [1987]), which was 
affirmed by this Board (21 PERB J3022 [1988]). In that case, 
several of the PBA's demands were found to be nonmandatory 
and thus not properly before the interest arbitration panel. 
At the pre-hearing conference in that matter, however, the 
PBA sought to revise its demands to delete the allegedly 
nonmandatory material. The City objected to any revision, 
asserting a right to a determination upon the language of the 
demands submitted by the PBA to interest arbitration. The 
ALJ sustained the objection, a ruling which we affirmed, upon 
Board - U-10242 
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the ground that the City was entitled to a determination on 
the PBA's submitted demands. The Board made no 
determination, however, concerning whether the PBA could 
submit further or revised demands to the City on these 
-matters-r- : :-—-——.•.- :— —•-.—-. ——•:———:—.—.-—-
Following the Board's affirmance in Case No. U-9509, 
which held several of the demands challenged by the City to 
be nonmandatory, the PBA submitted revised demands on the 
same subjects to the City for negotiation. The City rejected 
the demand to negotiate and the instant charge ensued. 
Exceptions 
Among its exceptions, the City asserts that the ALT 
erroneously concluded as a matter of fact that the first 
notice which the PBA had of the City's claim that the at-
issue demands were nonmandatory was on or about June 22, 
1987, when the City filed improper practice charge Case No. 
U-9509. The record, in fact, establishes that the City made 
known to the PBA its view that the at-issue articles were 
nonmandatory on at least two occasions well before the 
interest arbitration process actually got underway. These 
two occasions were on December 31, 1985, when the City 
originally submitted its proposals for a successor agreement 
and identified the at-issue articles in its "Non-Mandatory 
Items" list and when it filed its improper practice charge on 
January 8, 1987, in response the PBA's subsequently withdrawn 
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interest arbitration petition. Between the withdrawal of the 
interest arbitration petition and March 9, 1987, when the 
City filed its own interest arbitration petition, the parties 
were still engaged in negotiations. 
r—rB-as-ed—upon~the~foregoi-ng~-evidence7" we-grant-so-~much of — •-— 
the City's exception as asserts that the decision below 
incorrectly found that the PBA was unaware of the City *s 
position concerning the allegedly nonmandatory items until 
June 22, 1987, when the City filed its post-interest 
arbitration petition improper practice charge. The effect of 
this finding on the outcome of the case is discussed infra. 
The City also excepts to the ALJ finding that the PBA 
"sought to amend its demands" in Case No. U-9509 by deleting 
language it believed was being challenged by the City. The 
City asserts that the demands made by the PBA at the pre-
hearing conference in Case No. U-9509 and submitted in 
writing thereafter were "new", basing its assertion, in part, 
upon a finding made by us in 21 PERB f3022, at footnote 2, 
where we stated 
The ALJ found the proposed changes to 
constitute substantive changes in the 
PBA's negotiating demands rather than 
mere clarifications of those demands. We 
agree with this finding. 
The City misconstrues our findings in this regard. 
While the demands offered by the PBA contain substantive 
revisions, they cannot be construed as raising new or 
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different subjects of bargaining, as would be the case if a 
party sought to withdraw a demand concerning one subject and 
substitute for it a demand on an entirely different subject 
which had not previously been negotiated. Indeed, the City does 
negotiations concerning interrogations, schedules and tours of 
duty, procedures for determining participation in professional, 
educational and training courses, and the other matters which 
were the subject of Case No. U-9509. The demands offered by the 
PBA at and after the pre-hearing conference in that matter, and 
in the matter now before us, are fairly characterized as 
substantive revisions of existing demands. 
! Notwithstanding the City's claim that the PBA is barred by 
the doctrines of collateral estoppel and/or res judicata from 
presenting revised demands to it, our earlier holding was 
limited to a determination that the PBA was not entitled as a 
matter of right to alter its demands because the alterations 
which it proposed were substantive in nature and not mere 
clarifications. To reach the opposite conclusion would render 
moot the improper practice charge which the City had filed and 
upon which it sought a determination that the Act had been 
violated and relieve PBA of all responsibility for its prior 
conduct. This approach is inappropriate to the enforcement and 
administration of the Act. 
Board - U-10242 
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The issue now between the parties is a different one: 
whether, following a finding that demands submitted to interest 
arbitration are nonmandatory, a party may correct the found 
deficiencies and seek negotiations on those matters during the 
-—period- -of — M m e - w h e n — t h e — i n t e r e s t — a r b - ^ ^ — — ~ 
pending. Because we did not reach that issue in the prior case, 
the City's claims of collateral estoppel and res judicata must 
fail. 
We affirm the ALT's determination, on the specific facts of 
this case, that the City violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act when it 
refused to' negotiate the PBA's revised demands due to the 
pendency of interest arbitration proceedings. We do so 
) notwithstanding our finding that the PBA indeed was aware of, 
and had the opportunity to alter, language in its demands which 
the City correctly contended was nonmandatory. In this regard, 
the fact that the City, at the outset of negotiations, made 
known its view that certain articles in the prior collective 
bargaining agreement contained nonmandatory language is of 
little moment. 1/ Of more significance is the fact that the PBA 
was placed on notice in January 1987, of the City's objection to 
V w e have often stated the view that negotiations which are 
broad in scope are to be encouraged, and that parties should 
even be encouraged to negotiate subjects which have been held to 
be nonmandatory if it is in their interest to do so. To that 
end, it is not until the final stages of the dispute resolution 
processes provided by the Act that an improper practice charge 
concerning insistence upon nonmandatory subjects will lie. See, 
e.g., Peekskill CSD, 16 PERB ^3075 (1983); Monroe-Woodbury CSD, 
10 PERB 1[3029 (1977) . 
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the assertedly nonmandatory language by the filing of the 
improper practice charge in Case No. U-9180. However, the PBA 
had no procedure available to it at that time to seek a Board 
determination concerning the negotiability of the demands 
— "asserted"-by-the City-to-be-nonmandatoryv-2-^ Thusy-the—oTiiL-y~~way—~ 
in which the PBA could have avoided the instant situation of 
seeking negotiation following the filing of an interest 
arbitration petition on demands which have been revised to 
conform with this Board's findings, would have been to simply 
accede to the City * s assertions that the language was 
nonmandatory prior to interest arbitration. Such a result is 
unreasonable and is not required by the Act, notwithstanding the 
) clear policy in favor of focused negotiations and the finality 
in the resolution of labor disputes. 
This result is contemplated by earlier decisions of this 
Board, such as Croton Police Association, 16 PERB 13100, 3167 
(1983), where we stated: 
As noted by the hearing officer, however, the 
direction that the Association withdraw the at-issue 
demands from arbitration does not preclude it from 
demanding negotiation thereon and in the event of 
impasse, to bring those demands to arbitration. 
^•/Effective May 7, 1987, we enacted rules authorizing the filing 
of declaratory ruling petitions, to enable either party to raise 
scope of bargaining questions under the Act (Part 210, Rules of 
Procedure). This procedure was not, however, available to the 
PBA between the declaration of impasse and submission of the 
City's interest arbitration petition, which occurred on or about 
March 9, 1987. 
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See also Town of Amherst, 13 PERB f3010, 3014 (1980), where we 
stated: 
Finally, we agree with the hearing officer that, 
inasmuch as the amended demands approved by us may not 
have been negotiated by the parties in that form, the 
Club pursued a proper course, consistent with the 
— — - -po-l-i-ci-es—of— our—statute-,—in—first—requesting—the~ToOTi ——-—~ 
to negotiate the two demands, as amended, before 
submission to the arbitration panel, [footnote - See 
Town of Haverstraw, 9 PERB f3063. If, after such 
opportunity for negotiations, the parties are unable 
to agree, the items should be referred to the 
previously designated arbitration panel for final 
disposition.] 
We also conclude that the City's exception which alleges 
that this Board lacks jurisdiction over the instant improper 
practice charge because of the pendency of the interest 
arbitration proceeding must be denied. As the ALJ found, this 
) Board has exclusive nondelegable jurisdiction to hear and decide 
improper practice charges, and such jurisdiction will not be 
transferred to an arbitration panel or elsewhere. (See Act 
§205.5(d).) In the instant case, the issues sought by the PBA 
to be negotiated are not issues which are currently (or even 
properly) before the interest arbitration 
panel at this time. Under the particular circumstances of this 
case, the City may not refuse to bargain the at-issue revised 
demands. The parties are reminded, however, that, in view of 
the availability since May 1987 of a procedure for filing a 
petition for a declaratory ruling, a greater opportunity (and 
responsibility) may lie with both parties to adjudicate the duty 
to bargain their respective demands before the interest 
Board - U-10242 
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arbitration stage is reached, so as to avoid the necessity for 
delay in the achievement of finality contemplated by interest 
arbitration. 
We have reviewed the remaining exceptions filed by the 
,-.-—-. v—ei-:feyy—whieh--priHma-r^  
PBA's revised demands are mandatory subjects of bargaining. For 
the reasons set forth in that decision which are deemed to be 
incorporated herein, we find the City's exceptions to be 
unpersuasive. The ALJ decision is accordingly affirmed and IT 
IS HEREBY ORDERED that the City of Schenectady: 
1. Negotiate in good faith with the PBA with respect to 
the demands here found to be mandatory subjects of 
negotiation; and 
2. Execute and post the attached notice at all locations 
ordinarily used by it to communicate information to 
unit employees. 
DATED: March 28, 1989 
Albany, New York 
^ ^ / ^ / ^ ^ t ^ g ^ , ^ -
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYE 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the negotiating unit represented by 
the Schenectady Police Benevolent Association that the City of 
Schenectady will negotiate in good faith with the Schenectady 
Police Benevolent Association with respect to the demands here 
found to be mandatory subjects of negotiation 
) 
City of Schenectady 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
#2D-3/28/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SUFFOLK COUNTY ASSOCIATION OF 
MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, INC., 
. .—.. _. _ _ _ — — - — - —eh-a-rg-i-ng- Party> — — - :-.-
-and- CASE NO. U-9211 
COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, 
Respondent. 
ROGERS & CARTIER, P.C., for Charging Party 
RAINS & POGREBIN, P.C., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the County 
of Suffolk (County) to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
decision which found that the County violated §209-a.l(d) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when, on or 
about January 9, 1987, it issued a memorandum prohibiting 
employees in its Real Estate Department from engaging in 
outside employment with any real estate firm, title company, 
appraisal consultant, or to otherwise sell real estate, and 
requiring the surrender of real estate licenses held by Real 
Estate Department employees to the County. The Suffolk 
County Association of Municipal Employees, Inc. (Association) 
asserts that the January 9, 1987 memorandum reflects a 
unilateral change in terms and conditions of employment, 
while the County asserts that the memorandum does not reflect 
Board - U-9211 -2 
a change, because it merely reflects existing County law and 
policy under its Code of Ethics. Alternatively, the County 
asserts that if a change was made in the extent to which 
outside employment is prohibited, the change constitutes a 
-management-prerogative- dictatedHby ~ethica-l- consd-deratrons-r—— 
The ALJ found that the Suffolk County Charter, at §A3 0-1 
thereof, prohibits conflicts of interest.-i/ This County Code 
of Ethics is administered and interpreted by a Board of 
Ethics which renders advisory opinions on request. 
In December 1984, the Board of Ethics issued an advisory 
opinion which provides, in part, as follows: 
The Board believes that for any employee, 
in his or her outside employment, to deal 
in a professional manner, or to provide 
information regarding any property in 
which the County may or does have an 
interest violates §A30-1.a of the Code of 
Ethics (sic) and must not continue. 
The ALJ found, among other things, that the January 9, 
1987 memorandum issued by the County reflects a unilateral 
change in terms and conditions of employment only if it 
exceeded the scope of the Board of Ethics opinion, which 
•^/section A30-1, Suffolk County Charter, prohibits 
employees of the County from being interested, directly or 
indirectly, in any contract or business or professional 
dealings with the County, acting as attorney, agent, broker, 
representative or employee in business or professional 
dealings with the County for any person or corporation in 
which they have a direct or indirect interest; and engaging 
in any private employment or rendering of services for 
private interest when such employment or service creates a 
conflict or impairs the proper discharge of their official 
duties. 
) 
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prohibits involvement in property transaction in which the 
County "may or does" have an interest and which represents 
the current practice. The ALT concluded that the language of 
the Board of Ethics opinion is properly construed as 
_. ™-re~quird-ngy"as~a~condi^ 
actually identifiable interest in property, and that the 
County's blanket prohibition against engagement by its Real 
Estate Department employees in any outside employment 
involving private real estate transactions exceeds the scope 
of the Board of Ethics opinion and the requirements of the 
Code of Ethics, as interpreted by that Board, and constituted 
a change which had to be negotiated. The ALT further found 
that no independent public policy had been established which 
) 
would justify the exclusion from negotiations of the issue of 
outside employment which exceeds the scope of the County law 
and interpretive advisory opinions thereof, and accordingly 
concluded that the County unilaterally altered terms and 
conditions of employment by prohibiting all outside 
employment of Real Estate Department employees, in violation 
of §209-a.l(d) of the Act. 
We agree with the ALT's determination that no public 
policy has been established which exceeds the scope of the 
County Charter and interpretive opinions issued by the Board 
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of Ethics.2/ However, it is our determination that the 
language of the Board of Ethics opinion, establishing that 
County employees may not engage in real estate transactions 
in which the County "may or does have an interest" is 
-properl-y—construed—as-prohi-bi-ting-engagement—in~transactrons ^ 
in which the County does or may reasonably have an interest. 
It is not necessary, under this construction, for the County 
to establish the existence of a specific identifiable 
interest in a specific parcel of property in which the County 
employee might be involved in the course of his or her 
outside employment, but the County must establish that a 
reasonable potential exists that the County will have an 
interest in the property in the future. 
Under ordinary circumstances, the County's assertion 
that it may have an interest in each and every parcel of 
property located within the County of Suffolk, and possibly 
even outside of it in adjoining Nassau County, would far 
exceed the scope of reasonableness. However, the 
uncontroverted testimony establishes that, not only does the 
County annually acquire approximately 7,000 parcels of 
property through nonpayment of taxes and through condemnation 
proceedings and other governmental purposes, but it has 
^/Board of Education of the City School District of the 
City of New York, 19 PERB ^3015 (1986) , conf'd. Board of 
Education of the City School District of the City of New York 
v. PERB, 21 PERB }[7001 (Sup. Ct. Alb. Cty. 1988) (appeal 
pending, A.D. 3d Dept). 
Board - U-9211 
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recently engaged in significant new acquisition programs. 
The first of these, begun in 1986, involves a $60 million 
acquisition program to purchase open space properties. 
Additionally, in 1987, the County enacted a bond issue for 
——-•••- -approximaterely—$57-1r mi-ll-ion—to^  enable- -the-County—to—acquirey—— 
by various methods, environmentally sensitive property within 
the County. In order to accomplish these acquisitions, a 
not-for-profit corporation acting on behalf of the County is 
involved in structuring exchanges of property, including some 
exchanges both outside the County of Suffolk, as well as 
within the County. This acquisition program will result in 
the acquisition for the County of approximately 32,000 acres 
) of environmentally sensitive properties, sometimes as the 
result of exchange of open space, industrial, or possibly 
residential, properties. On the basis of this testimony, it 
appears that the County may reasonably have an interest in 
acquiring not only environmentally sensitive property, but 
any and all types of property as a means to the acquisition 
of environmentally sensitive property. Under these 
circumstances, and for the duration of these two special 
acquisition programs, any and all property within the County 
may reasonably come within the ambit of properties in which 
the County has an interest. 
Based upon this specific and particularized factual 
situation, it is our determination that the blanket 
Board - U-9211 
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prohibition against engagement in real estate transactions in 
the course of outside employment by its Real Estate 
Department employees falls within the existing prohibition 
against outside employment in relation to properties in which 
-.—:—-—.— —the—County-may -or "does- have "an—interest" and" thus-~doe"s~not~~~r 
give rise to a unilateral change in terms and conditions of 
employment. To this extent, the ALJ's decision is reversed. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing holding, it is our 
determination that, as found by the ALJ, the seizure by the 
County of Real Estate Department employees' real estate 
licenses violates §209-a.l(d) of the Act. This is so because 
the seizure of licenses, while an expedient means of 
) enforcing the Code of Ethics, is not the only means available 
to the County to achieve such enforcement and, as held by the 
ALT, exceeds the scope of implementation of existing Code 
provisions, by imposing a new restriction. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the County: 
1. Immediately rescind and cease enforcement or 
implementation of so much of its memorandum of 
January 9, 1987 as directs the surrender of real 
estate licenses to the Commissioner of the 
Department of Real Estate; 
2. Immediately release and return all real 
estate licenses surrendered pursuant 
thereto by any employee to the County or 
Board - U-9211 
its agents, whether under the direct or indirect 
control of the County or its agents; 
Negotiate in good faith with the Association with 
respect to the terms and conditions of employment 
-o f—unit—employees—cons istent-wi-th—i-ts—duty-under"™- -
the Act; and 
Sign and post a notice in the form attached at all 
locations at which any affected unit employees work 
in places ordinarily used to post notices of 
information to such employees. 
DATED: March 28, 1989 








NOTICE TO ALL E 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the Suffolk 
County Association of Municipal Employees, Inc, that the County of 
Suffolk: 
1„ Will immediately rescind and cease enforcement or 
implementation of so much of its memorandum of January 9, 1987 
as directs the surrender of real estate licenses to the Commissioner 
of the Department of Real Estate; 
2, Will immediately release and return all real estate 
licenses surrendered pursuant thereto by an employee to the County 
or its agents, whether under the direct or indirect control of 
the County or its agents; and 
3. Will negotiate in good faith with the Association with 
respect to the terms and' conditions of employment of unit employees 
consistent with its duty under the Act. 
COUNTY OF SUFFOLK 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
//3A-3/28/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CHAUFFEURS, TEAMSTERS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND 
HELPERS, LOCAL UNION NO. 529, 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
—__-—„_. ___..—r ___.— ._. —.. --^ Petitioner-, - - - - - — — _:- :——-T 
-and- CASE NO. C-3395 
TOWN OF VETERAN, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Chauffeurs, Teamsters, 
Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union No. 529, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as the 
representative of the employees in such unit who are members-^/ of 
1/ Because of the absence of agreement to "exclusivity" by the 
Town, the right of representation is on a members only basis. 
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the Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union 
No. 529, International Brotherhood of Teamsters for the purpose 
of collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Laborers, truck drivers, equipment operators, 
mechanics and deputy highway superintendent. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Chauffeurs, Teamsters, 
Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union No. 529, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: March 28, 1989 
Albany, New York 
C&H?-UL^L<t^_^-
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member r 
#3B-3/28/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 316, 
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, 
CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF 
AMERICA, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3438 
VILLAGE OF LIVERPOOL, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local Union No. 
316, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, 
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO has been designated 
and selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named 
public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and 
described below, as their exclusive representative for the 
purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Certification - C-3438 
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Un it: Included: 
Excluded: 
Motor Equipment Operator I, Maintenance 
Worker I, Maintenance Worker II and 
Laborer. 
All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local Union No. 
316, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, 
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: March 28, 1989 
Albany, New York 
' Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membetf 
#3C-3/28/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 687, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3441 
TOWN OF ELLISBURG, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local 687 has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative 
for the purpose of collective negotiations and the settlement of 
grievances. 
Unit: Included: Truck drivers, motor equipment operators, heavy 
equipment operators, mechanics, and laborers, 
employed in the highway department. 
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Excluded: Highway superintendent, part-time, seasonal, 
casual employees and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Teamsters Local 687. The 
duty~tcr~:n^ t^a^ t"e"^ "ori~ei?t~i^  
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: March 28, 1989 
Albany, New York 
]
'SU<<rkC&^-^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
^ r : 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
) 
//3D-3/28/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
HEMPSTEAD BUILDINGS & GROUNDS ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
——-—— —-•and.--—-••—•• :-:-•--—--"--—----—-——•-——-: —--CAS-E--NO^ --C^ -3-4-4-7- ~" 
HEMPSTEAD UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, NASSAU LOCAL 830, 
HEMPSTEAD UNIT, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, Nassau Local 830, 
Hempstead Unit has been designated and selected by a majority of 
the employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit 
agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
Certification - C-3447 
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exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All custodial and maintenance personnel. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, Nassau Local 830, 
Hempstead Unit. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: March 28, 1989 
Albany, New York 
/^/Harold R. "Newman, Chairman 
:- X 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
//3E-3/28/89 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MICHAEL SPILKEN and DEIRDRE BARRY, 
Petitioners, 
" ""^and-^ :'~ ~" "c^FTN^r"c-^465 
MONTICELLO CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
SCHOOL AND LIBRARY EMPLOYEES LOCAL UNION 
NO. 74, SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL 
UNION, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding-!/ having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the School and Library Employees 
Local Union No. 74, Service Employees International Union, AFL-
CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
1/ The proceeding was instituted by a petition seeking 
decertification of the intervenor as negotiating agent. 
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") employees of the above named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time and part-time bus drivers, 
mechanics , mechanic h e l p e r s , head mechanics , 
•••
—
—~ "•—"-•' --"—-—- iii^p^tch~eTrs~and"^imreirtory/mecffaTTi^^l"^:! e r Jcs. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the School and Library 
Employees Local Union No. 74, Service Employees International 
Union, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the 
mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or 
any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: March 28, 1989 
Albany, New York 
^fc-e^/. /J* 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
i^ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
//3F-3/28/8? 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
HYDE PARK CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 
UNITED EMPLOYEES, NEA/NY, NEA, 
Petitioner, 
HYDE PARK CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
KYDE PARK SECRETARIAL AND CLERICAL UNIT, 
DUTCHESS COUNTY, LOCAL 867, CIVIL SERVICE 
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Hyde Park Central School 
District United Employees, NEA/NY, NEA has been designated and 
selected by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
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below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All secretarial and clerical employees as 
well as teaching assistants and teaching 
aides and monitors. 
Excluded": _Se"ere1^ i^ piro"ri^ «~Bu^ "^ess~AdminTsl5ra%oT-7r~—~ 
Secretary to the Assistant Superintendent 
for Curriculum & Instruction, Secretary to 
the Superintendent of Schools, Administra-
tive Assistant to the Superintendent of 
Schools, Secretary to the Supervisor of 
Transportation, Secretary to the Supervisor 
of Buildings and Grounds, Secretary to the 
Director of Pupil Personnel Services, and 
all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Hyde Park Central School 
District United Employees, NEA/NY, NEA. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: March 28, 1989 
Albany, New York 
»JLjZ 'JLMh^U^tty^-^ 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member/ 
